DISCUSSION*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

RESPONSE TO COMMENTARIES

A.
B.
C.
D.
III.

......................................

Does Government Produce Public Goods? ..................
Is the Legitimacy of Government Activity Relevant to Official
Im m un ity? ..............................................

ALTERNATIVES TO LIABILITY

A.

B.

V.

Development of the Official- and Sovereign-Immunity Doctrin e s ......................
.. ....... .... .. .. ...... .. ....
Why Official Immunity Replaced Sovereign Immunity ......
The Erosion of Official Immunity: Section 1983 ............
Summary: The Purpose of Liability .......................

THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

A.
B.
IV.

..................................

DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMMUNITY DOCTRINES AND THEIR EXCEPTIONS

...................................

W hat Are the Alternatives? ...............................
1. Legislative O versight .................................
2. Procedural Constraints ...............................
3. Judicial Review ......................................
Why Seek Alternatives to Civil Liability? ...................
1. Problems of Valuation in Civil Liability .................
2. An Alternative to Evaluating Damages .................

CALCULATING THE INCENTIVES OF GOVERNMENT OFFICERS ...........

A . Skewed Incentives .......................................
B. The Incentives of Sovereign Liability ......................
1. Arguments For Sovereign Liability .....................
a. Employees Do Not Claim the Benefits of Their Prod uction ..........................................
b. Sovereign Liability Spread Risks ...................
2. Arguments Against Sovereign Liability .................
a. Problems of Municipal Liability ....................
b. Agencies Are Not Susceptible to the Incentives of Liab ility ....... ........ ... ...... ........ ...... ......
c. Agencies Cannot Transmit Incentives to Their Emplo yees ..........................................
3. Arguments Against the Comparison ...................
C. The Incentives of Liability Combined With Indemnification
1. Indemnification of the Official by the Government-Does
It Approximate Sovereign Liability? ....................

81
84
84
85
87
89
90
90
91
94
94
94
94
96
97
97
99
100
100
103
103
103
103
104
104
10 5
106
106
107
107

* This discussion has been extracted and edited from a verbatim transcript of the seminar pro-

ceedings. Each participant has been provided with a copy of the edited version and the opportunity to make corrections in it.-Ed.

DISCUSSION

Page 80: Winter 1978]

a.

2.

V I.

Differences of Incentives Between Official Liability
With Indemnification and Sovereign Liability .......
b. Differences in the Compensation of Injured Parties ..
c. Incentives Skewed by Indemnification ..............
Indemnification of the Government by the Official-Does
It Approximate Official Liability? ......................
a. Differences Between Official Liability and Sovereign
Liability W ith Indemnification .....................
b. Differences Between the Public and Private Sectors

FURTHER RESEARCH

..........................................

107
108
110
111
112
112
113

I
RESPONSE TO COMMENTARIES
MANNE.
To begin today's program on the subject of civil liability of government officers, I'd like to call on Professor Jerry Mashaw, of Yale Law
School, to respond to the commentaries on his paper.'

Thank you, Henry. I am indebted to Henry Manne for many
things, including a little magazine clipping he sent me to illustrate the importance of civil liability for government officers. It reported on a small town in
Kansas that had just gone out of business. The town managers, who were
elected officials, had discovered that under section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act 2 they were potentially liable for violations of people's constitutional rights.
They had therefore asked an insurance company what the premium would be
on an insurance policy to cover their liability for such violations. They discovered that the insurance premium would exceed the total budget of the
town. They thereupon disbanded the town by forfeiting its charter and took
up a collection for the maintenance of the only public service that was really
important to anyone: the street lights. So even though our topic is the civil
liability of officials, this piece of casual empirical information illustrates that it
also includes the ability of government to do its job.
As I read the commentators' papers and began to grasp what they were
saying to me, I realized that each of them would like me to discuss the operation of official immunity under two or three-in some cases six or twelvedifferent hypothetical conditions. Mancur Olson' wants to know how the nature of government-produced goods affects the operation of civil liability. Ken
Shepsle 4 wants to know how liability will affect different government decision
MASHAW.

1. Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and Official Accountability, LAW &
Winter 1978, at 8.-Ed.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).-Ed.
3. Olson, Official Liability and Its Less Legalistic Alternatives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Winter
1978, at 67.-Ed.
4. Shepsle, Official Errorsand Official Liability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Winter 1978, at 35.-Ed.
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procedures that have differing probabilities of error. Bill Baxter 5 wants to
know what the sovereign-immunity rule is and how government bureaus will
respond to variations in that rule. Richie Epstein 6 wants to know which government functions should be covered by official immunity and what the
standard of official liability should be. Well, to discuss all of the permutations
of these conditions would require a paper considerably longer than the one I
had in mind-and, indeed, longer than the Liberty Fund is prepared to fund.
Let me just make some brief comments about each commentator's paper.
They had the good grace not to comment directly on mine. But having left

the South for New Haven and abandoned Southern ways, I will attack.
Mancur Olson's paper leaves me puzzled. He, unlike Bill Baxter, says that
I can talk about official immunity without talking about sovereign immunity
and, what's more, that the distinction between the two should be even sharper
than the one I drew. 7 Yet the framework he suggests for the analysis of official immunity appears to be appropriate only to sovereign immunity. Mancur's analysis rests on the proposition that the public nature of goods produced by the government makes it difficult to evaluate a particular official's
8
output, and therefore difficult to impose civil liability on individual officials.
Yet the proposition that it is almost impossible to evaluate officials' performances simply does not comport with my experience of how government
agencies monitor their employees. Employees in the public sector can be
monitored by piece rates, which measure inputs: agencies can measure how
many cases each employee takes on, for example, rather than attempt to
measure the social value of each employee's output. The difficulty of evaluating government output only affects the enterprise as a whole, as it attempts to
place the social costs of its activities in equilibrium with the social benefits.
This is why I find Mancur's analysis at odds with his statement that
government-enterprise-that is, sovereign-immunity should be ignored.
Ken Shepsle's paper suggests something that is highly important: government officers are going to make errors, and our concern is what sort of errors
we want them to make. But the liability rule that I talk about in my paper
does not address the tradeoff between the different types of error that occur
once errors have been reduced to their lower boundary: my liability rule addresses the question whether errors have even been reduced that far. What it
attempts to decide is whether an official's conduct is unreasonable. And one
definition of unreasonable conduct is conduct that exceeds the level of error
that is permissible because it is inevitable, given the difficulties of specification
5.

Baxter, Government-Enterprise and Private-EnterpriseLiability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Winter

1978, at 45.-Ed.
6. Epstein, Private-Law Models for Official Liability,
53.-Ed.
7. Olson, supra note 3, at 69.-Ed.
8. Id. at 71-73.-Ed.
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and inference that Ken quite correctly points out. In the terms of Ken's illustration,9 an official whose errors lie on the ab frontier should bear no liability
for the harms he causes; it is the official whose errors lie at point c who is
deemed liable by this rule.
This brings me to Bill Baxter's paper, which suggests that official liability
requires second-guessing of official decisions.' 0 The liability rule I have just
outlined is formulated precisely to avoid second-guessing. It is a test of reasonableness: once it determines that a decisionmaking scheme is within the
zone of error that can reasonably be expected, it doesn't question specific
decisions. I think that courts continually make that sort of determination outside of the context of liability for damages in the traditional forms of judicial
review." One of our requirements for administrative legitimacy is that administrators and bureaucrats be subject to precisely that sort of review.
Bill Baxter suggests that the problems of second-guessing that he discusses
are analogous to the cause-of-action problems that I discuss: 12 in fact, the two
issues are somewhat different. Second-guessing is one of many cause-of-action
problems: parties affected by official decisions cannot specify legal duties
owed them by the decisionmakers that would justify legal action; and in the
absence of such legal grounds, judicial review would be mere second-guessing.
But there are other problems with causes of action against officials, including
problems of determining damages and causation, which go beyond the problem of second-guessing.
Richie Epstein has produced an intriguing formulation of the categories of
official activities. He classifies official activities as either quasi-judicial or nonquasi-judicial; this is, I think, a new statement of the distinction between governmental functions and proprietary functions, and it is at least as troublesome.
The distinguishing feature of quasi-judicial decisions is that they choose
between competing interests. Epstein characterizes the decision to grant a

9. Shepsle, supra note 4, Table at 41.-Ed.
10. Baxter, supa note 5,at 49-50.-Ed.
11. When the participants speak of 'judicial review" they are referring to the process by
which a party injured by a government agency may seek judicial review of an administrative
decision after the administrative remedies have been exhausted. The Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), is a blanket provision for judicial review of agency action. In addition
there are specific review provisions such as the one in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45c (1976), which states, "Any person .. .required by an order of the Commission to
cease and desist . . . may obtain a review of such order in the circuit court of appeals . . . [T]he

court shall have jurisdiction . . . to make and enter a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside
the order of the Commission, and enforcing the same to the extent that such order is affirmed
...."The review procedure can provide only equitable relief unless an action for damages has
been established by statute.
Final judgments of a court of appeals proceeding to review agency decisions are reviewable by
the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 2350 (1970).-Ed.
12. Baxter, supra note 5, at 50-51.-Ed.
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permit for the building of a dam as quasi-judicial; 13 and I agree that such a
decision chooses between competing interests. But I think that competing
interests are also at stake in the sonic boom case, which Epstein offers as an
example of non-quasi-judicial activity.14 Somebody decided where to fly the
airplane that creates a sonic boom; and that decision required tradeoffs
among speed, directness of route, fuel savings, and potential harm to citizens.
A serious problem of characterization arises in this case. Is it an injury to an
uninterested party or a choice among competing interests? And the decision
whether to hold officials liable hangs on this characterization.
I am not sure how to resolve this problem effectively. I think it might be
fruitful to ask what opportunities the plaintiff had to become a participant in
the decisionmaking process rather than a stranger. To what extent did constraints on the decisionmaking process enable the plaintiff to negotiate in
support of his interests? I suggest that it may be inappropriate to relax immunity rules in decisions of that kind.
II
DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMMUNITY DOCTRINES AND THEIR EXCEPTIONS
ORDESHOOK.
I am interested in an explanation of how the doctrine of
official immunity came about and why the exceptions to it are made.

A.

Development of the Official- and Sovereign-Immunity Doctrines

BAXTER.
Let me give a two-minute history in response to Peter Ordeshook's question. It begins in England a number of centuries ago, at a time
when the country was ruled by an individual sovereign. At that time the expression that the king could do no wrong was used in a very paradoxical way.
If one of the king's agents burned down a house, the courts reasoned by a
strange syllogism: Burning down a house is a terribly wrong thing to do; the
king can do no wrong; and therefore, the agent was not acting for the king.
By this syllogism the governmental character of people who committed
wrongs was denied, and this denial rendered them liable to suit like anybody
else.
In the change to an institutional government the sovereign immunity,
which in England attached only to the person of the king, was enormously
generalized. It therefore became impossible in a wide variety of contexts to
sue the government. A party injured by the government could not obtain a
damage remedy from the U.S. Treasury. However, he could still sue government officials in their private capacities by naming them personally rather

13.
14.

Epstein, supra note 6, at 56.-Ed.

Id.-Ed.
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than by title. His suit merely had to fit within the traditional definition of
private tort remedies.
That situation persisted until World War II, and for some reason it began
to reverse at that time. First, the government started waiving the immunity of
government as such. The most sweeping waiver was in the Federal Tort
Claims Act,' 5 although that Act contained a specific exception for so-called
discretionary functions, 16 which remained immune from liability. At about the
same time the courts began denying the individual responsibility of government officers, particularly those engaged in discretionary functions like the
functions excepted by the Tort Claims Act. Thus, a two-way reversal took
place: an opening of access of the U.S. Treasury and a closing of access to
individual officials.
ARANSON.
That is the historical development of the immunity doctrine.
But it fails to explain why certain people are immune and others are not. My
theory is that officials want to be immune, and that they are sufficiently cohesive to obtain that immunity from the government. Originally, the king could
do no wrong because the king didn't want people to think he could do wrong.
It was also useful to the king to permit his officials to be held liable occasionally. If my recollection of English history is correct, he used that liability as a
tool, by generating suits against his own ministers. In this theory it becomes
clear that immunity from liability is an exclusive public policy that one group,
government officials, has imposed on everyone else.
The reason that immunity does not extend beyond the government is that
the average citizen in a competitive environment may actually prefer to be
liable. Liability may improve the value of his product to prospective buyers,
since it insures them against certain kinds of loss. The private citizen, by contrast, may not prefer to be liable, but may lack the political wherewithal to
obtain immunity. Thus, immunity simply covers those who both desire it and
have the political capacity to obtain it.

B.

Why Official Immunity Replaced Sovereign Immunity

I think many of us were surprised by how recently the rule of
official immunity developed in the U.S. Supreme Court. 7 It is a very interesting question why the reversal that Bill Baxter just described occurred when it
did. Why not a hundred years earlier?
MANNE.

MASHAW.

My colleague Bill Nelson"8 has done some work on that subject

15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 72, 75, 77-80 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).-Ed.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2680.-Ed.
17. The opinion in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), contains the first Supreme Court
articulation of the modern official-immunity doctrine.-Ed.
18. Nelson, Officeholding and Power-Wielding: An Analysis of the Relationship between Structure and
Style in American Administrative History, 10 LAW & Soc. REV. 187 (1976).-Mashaw.
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and has some evidence that the rules changed, in part, as the nature of officeholding changed. In the past officials purchased offices and were not required to keep their personal funds separate from public funds. There was
therefore a certain symmetry, which no longer exists, between the appropriation of benefits and the incidence of costs. Liability rules changed, in part,
because officeholders no longer appropriated the benefits of public property,
and were therefore no longer expected to bear the costs.
This does not explain why the change in the nature of officeholding resulted in the absolute immunity doctrine rather than the adaptation of the
traditional causes of action. For example, officials who were mistaken in the
exercise of their authority were traditionally held strictly liable for intentional
torts: an official who destroyed a horse or battered a citizen was strictly liable
if he did so in error. As officeholding changed, it might have been possible to
adapt the traditional tort rules governing these cases. The rules might have
changed to allow a defense of reasonableness or good faith, or to delineate a
cause of action that took into account the official's obligation to exercise what
he reasonably believed to be his duty. The explanation for the absolute immunity doctrine, which goes much further, has eluded me. I don't know why
the response has been excessive.
BAXTER.
Let me propose another answer to the question why the rule of
official immunity developed when it did. My answer is that the enormous
expansion of government in the 1930's and through World War II caused the
activities of government officers to resemble the activities of private individuals less and less. Officials were given increasingly wider discretion. The courts
began to realize that by entering controversies over official decisions, they
were second-guessing the propriety of those decisions, although they were institutionally unfit to do so. However, I am not sure that my personal
hypothesis would be widely shared.
SHAPO.
In response to Professor Baxter's hypothesis about a distinction
between official activities and private activites, I want to cite a case that I think
is still central: Dalehite v. United States. 9 This case involved some ships carrying
fertilizer that exploded and destroyed the entire dock area of Texas City. The
fertilizer was bound for France as part of a comprehensive plan to aid European agriculture, and certain information had been trickling out about its
explosiveness. Among the acts of negligence alleged against the government
were that the bagging temperatures were too high, that the material used in
the bags was flammable or explosive, and that the labeling on the bags was
20
insufficient to warn of the dangers.
Now, I submit that these were matters that would fall within the purview

19.
20.

346 U.S. 15 (1953).-Ed.
346 U.S. at 45.-Ed.
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of corporate officials in similar situations, and for which corporations would
have been held liable. Yet the Supreme Court of the United States held 4 to 3
(with two justices not participating) in favor of the Government, saying that it
was not liable. The Federal enterprise was not held liable though there were
$200 million in damages and no way to obtain meaningful relief from the
individuals responsible-except for the private bills subsequently passed by
Congress. Three very distinguished justices came together in the dissenting
opinion to say that the rule of the case seemed to be that "the King can do
only little wrongs."21

C.

The Erosion of Official Immunity:

Section 1983

EPSTEIN.
Bill Baxter's history of the immunity doctrine omitted one development that we ought to mention, namely, section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act.22 Section 1983 is simply a statute which says that one can sue individual
officials for violations of rights defined in the Constitution. It is thus an attack
on official immunity.
The statute has been construed to exclude municipalities from direct
suit. 23 This means that 1983 expands official but not sovereign liability: only
the individual government officer can be named as a defendant. That is one
of the reasons why local government officials have become so scrupulous, particularly since the cases of the early 1960's. They know that they may be liable
even though the sovereign itself is not.
If I were to make a bet on what the future trend will be, I would say that
1983 will generate rules qualifying official immunity for most of the usual
torts. The substantive claims made under 1983 will change the officialimmunity doctrine, because of the interplay of statutory and constitutional
principles.
LEVINE.
Section 1983 has of course been around for a little over a
hundred years, although it has been widely used only since the Civil Rights
Act. As I understand it, litigation under section 1983 dates back at least thirty
or forty years. So how can we account for the sudden sensitivity of officials to
their liability under this statute?
EPSTEIN.
One of the reasons why section 1983 is much more important
today than thirty or forty years ago is that the nature of constitutional claims
has changed.

21. 346 U.S. at 60. Justice Jackson wrote the dissenting opinion in which he was 'joined by
Justices Black and Frankfurter-Ed.
22. Note 2 supra.-Ed.
23. A recent Supreme Court decision in Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services,
98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978) (announced June 6) overturned the previous exclusion of municipalities
from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Monell case overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).-Ed.
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DELLINGER.
I think that what you're suggesting might not be clear, Professor Epstein. Section 1983 does not state its own cause of action: it merely
qualifies officials' immunity to actions defined elsewhere in substantive law. As
long as officials were constitutionally free to be racially discriminatory or to
deny prisoners religious meetings or to suspend a child from school without a
hearing, they were liable under 1983 in very few areas. It is the explosion of
substantive constitutional requirements that leads to the increased impact of
section 1983.
The courts are now finding themselves flooded with actions under 1983,
and the Supreme Court has limited substantive causes of action in response to
the overuse of 1983 in recent due-process cases. 2 4 So there is interplay between the immunity doctrine of section 1983 and the substantive law.

SHAPO. Section 1983 has indeed been interpreted to apply to a broad
range of torts. That broad interpretation began in the early 1960's, when it
was applied principally to cases of police brutality. 25 It has since been extended to cases ranging from legislative reapportionment 26 to racial segrega28
tion 27 to denials of liquor licenses.
EPSTEIN.
To give another example, there was a recent decision in
California which held that doctors who sit on disciplinary panels are personally subject to damage actions if they don't follow their own internal procedures.

But perhaps the lynchpin in the present development of official
liability under section 1983 is Scheuer v. Rhodes. 29 Scheuer dealt with injuries
inflicted in the disturbances at Kent State University. The decisions qualified
the immunity of several high officials, including the governor of Ohio, the
president of the university, and the commandant of the National Guard.
SHAPO.

Under Scheuer the qualifications of section 1983 have altered the
official immunity for discretionary functions. Sending out the National Guard
to quell a riot was formerly regarded as an exercise of discretion which was
protected by the judicially developed official immunity. Yet by changing the
cause of action to a constitutional claim, the plaintiffs were able to circumvent
that absolute immunity.
EPSTEIN.

SHAPO.

Do I understand correctly, Professor Epstein, that you think that

24. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).-Ed.
25. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Appolonia, 323 F. Supp. 1269 (D.C. Pa. 1971); Selico v. Jackson, 201
F. Supp. 475 (D.C. Cal. 1962).-Ed. See also, Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the
FrontiersBeyond, 60 N.W.U. L. REV. 277, 297-312 (1965).-Shapo.
26. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).-Ed.
27. See. e.g.. Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, cert. denied 376 U.S. 910 (1964).-Ed.
28. See, e.g., Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); Haaf v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 337 F. Supp. 772 (D.C. Minn. 1971).-Ed.
29. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).-Ed.
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if the suit had been brought against the federal government for the acts of its
employees-if the commandant, for example, had been judged to be an employee of the federal government as well as the state-the federal government
would have remained immune under the Tort Claims Act because of the
discretionary-function exception?
Perhaps not for the actions of the commandant. But for the
actions of officials whose functions are discretionary, the government would
have been immune under the Tort Claims Act. And those officials themselves
would have been immune under the judicially developed immunity doctrine if
the suits had not been brought on constitutional grounds under section 1983.
EPSTEIN.

D.

Summary: The Purpose of Liability

DAVIS. The shifts between sovereign and official immunity that Bill Baxter and Richard Epstein have just described ought to be viewed in light of the
purpose of civil liability. If the purpose is compensation of the injured parties,
then the proper entity to sue is the one with assets, that is, the sovereign. This
is the case in most countries: the injured party sues the government directly
and doesn't bother about the official. The action in the Conseil d'Etat in France
is an example."
In the United States and England there was a very curious resistance to
that process. As Professor Baxter has pointed out, that resistance took the
form of sovereign immunity. The injured party was forced to sue the individual official who committed the wrong, since he couldn't sue the entity with
significant resources.
Until the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, the common
law insisted that in the process of determining fault and damages the official
responsible for an injury be the defendant. A similar rule arose in the insurance industry: insurance companies, which controlled assets and were therefore logical defendants in damage suits, resisted direct actions against themselves and insisted that liability be adjudicated between the injured party and
the party who caused the injury. Although the rationale was different, the
parallel suggests that the common law is unique in its emphasis on individual
responsibility.
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the famous Civil Rights statute, is another indication of
the belief that the offending party should be involved in the process of determining responsibility. Thus our legal system appears to focus on purposes
other than compensation. Perhaps it serves the purpose of retribution by
bringing the culpable party to trial; and perhaps this encourages more responsible official behavior.
30.

For a general discussion of the Conseil d'Etat, see REN

DAVID &

HENRY DE VRIES, THE

FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS 39, 45-46,

92 (1958).-Ed.
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But this system is clearly contrary to the purpose of compensation, since
it frequently denies access to assets that can compensate the injured parties meaningfully. So we have to weigh the social purposes served by either
system.
III
THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

A.

Does Government Produce Public Goods?

The discussion of social purposes seems to fall into what I
call the public-interest trap. If Peter Aranson's hypothesis is correct-that is, if
there is a system of official immunity because officials want it-then we
should not look to the public interest when trying to understand the distribution of liability and immunity. We should not fall into the trap of assuming
that government in general-and our immunity rules in particular-serve
public rather than private interests.
Take as an example Mancur Olson's assumption that governments are in
the business of producing public goods."i This assumption is derived from a
theoretical model of the inefficiency of markets that deal in public goods.
Theoretically, this inefficiency would justify intervention by the state through
its powers of coercion. But it doesn't follow that the government is in fact
using its coercive powers to produce or to regulate public goods. Practice
doesn't follow the normative model.
I would contend that governments are in the business of providing private
goods-or at least that a private characteristic of goods dictates what governments do. For example, consider the construction of highways, which are presumably archetypal public goods. What determines the supply of highways?
On the one hand are the contractors, concrete and asphalt companies, and
the trucking industry; on the other hand are the people whose yards the
highways cross. These sets of interests, and not some bureaucrat in Washington figuring out the optimal supply of highways, dictate the supply. I suspect
that supply is determined similarly in national defense, which is the classic
example of a public good. Although one aircraft carrier would be the optimal
supply, there are three shipyards: so we build three aircraft carriers.
So when we look at the distribution of civil liability and immunity, we
shouldn't fall into the trap of assuming that it is determined by the public
interest.
ORDESHOOK.

OLSON.
Your definition of a public good seems to require that people
who provide it or organize it think only of the known public interest. I
shouldn't imagine that any goods meet that requirement.

31.

Note 8supra.-Ed.
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ORDESHOOK.
I am not sure that I could rigorously define the difference
between public and private goods. Goods such as highways may be public in
consumption but private in production. There are various kinds of benefits
that occur at different points of the production and consumption of these
goods.
LEVINE.
I think that Professor Olson's paper is rather badly confused in
these areas. He seems to think that public goods are always massive and private goods are always small, and that one can always experiment with private
goods cheaply but with public goods only at great expense. But I think that
the distinction between public and private goods is not that clear. For example, I can write a limerick-which is a virtually pure public good-and experiment with it by trying it out on a few people to see how they like it. Or I can
engage in a one-man experiment on the effect of smoking on mortality-that
is, on a supposedly private good-which will be very expensive and difficult to
repeat. The public or private character of an enterprise may not affect what
can be learned about how it ought to operate. Thus, the public-good character of some governmental activities ought not to affect one's view of how immunity ought to work.
In arguing that the public nature of government goods precludes knowledge of their production functions, Olson also fails to distinguish among the
problems of identifying the incentives of enterprises and employees, identifying their outputs, and identifying their production functions. These are three
different questions.

B.

Is the Legitimacy of Government Activity Relevant
to Official Immunity?

Michael Levine seems to be saying that I should have distinguished among the questions what a government agency is trying to produce,
how it should produce it, and whether it has in fact produced it. Perhaps he
emphasizes these distinctions because he would like to use official liability to
discourage the government from performing other functions: what a government agency is producing, rather than how much, is thus of great importance to him, since he would like to relax official immunity on the basis of
that determination alone.
Levine's approach, however, would not encourage or coerce officials to
carry out government policy conscientiously. Instead, by limiting or abolishing
official immunity, it would require the courts to undercut decisions of the
Congress and the President. This approach would fundamentally change the
roles of the various arms of our government.
But I think that official liability is a poor instrument for this purpose. We
would all agree that government intervention is sometimes mistaken and
foolish. We would probably disagree intensely on how often inappropriate
OLSON.
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government intervention occurs, but we would all recognize that it does occur.
One of the reasons that some people suggest that official immunity ought to
be abolished or restricted is their view that official liability will solve the problem of needless government intervention. Official liability is a form of judicial
guerilla warfare against the government.
The first problem with this view was described both in my paper and in
Professor Baxter's: enterprise liability may be better suited to this purpose
than official liability. One could concede the desirability of containing the
government without conceding the desirability of individual official liability.
A second problem with this view follows from Professor Shepsle's point:
the government is bound to make errors one way or another. As Professor
Epstein's paper argued, these errors are made in the evaluation of obscure
costs and obscure benefits.

32

We therefore wonder whether the courts will

have any more success than other parts of the government.
So while we agree that government intervention is sometimes unwarranted, many of us question whether official liability is the best means of curbing it. We argue that the rules of immunity must deal with these activities
whether they are desirable or not.
MASHAW.
I do not view official liability as part of the guerilla war against
big government. It is narrowly limited to cases in which one can say, without
second-guessing a decision, that official action has been unreasonable and has
inflicted specific harms on specific parties. Perhaps official liability limits the
activity of government in certain circumstances. But it may also increase government activity and intervention when the possibilities for suit arise from
government inaction rather than government action. For example, liability
may increase official caution as manifested in the use of preliminary injunctions, investigation, and the like.
LEVINE.
I am not sure that I was advocating judicial guerilla warfare
against the government, as Professor Olson has suggested. I was saying that
we should separate the problems of calculating government production
functions from our feelings about what government does. If we are generally
skeptical of government, then we should be willing to enable individuals who
feel injured by government activities to have those activities reviewed. And
this principle is independent of the problems of identifying government production functions: it rests instead on the very nature of what the government
produces.
CAPRON.
The important decisions about what government does are
largely legislative decisions and are influenced by officials only marginally.
The lawyers have told us-and I would agree-that it would be very difficult

32.

Epstein, supra note 6, at 61.-Ed.
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to use official liability to affect those decisions. We know that we are not going
to make members of Congress liable for the votes they make in committees
and on the floor.
EPSTEIN.
I think Professor Mashaw is right when he says that official liability is not concerned with the legitimacy of government activities: a suit
against the government or its officers must assume the legitimacy of the activity and inquire only into particular deviations in its performance.
If we want to wage judicial guerilla warfare against intrusive government,
we must realize that official liability is only one of many possible ways. If we
really wanted to encourage control of bureaucratic behavior by individual citizens, we would not do so by eliminating official immunity. We would much
prefer a method used, for example, under the Environmental Protection Act
of 1970. 33 That Act provides that any private party who objects to another
party's construction can file a challenge, demand an environmental impact
statement, and then challenge the sufficiency of that statement in the courts.
The Act circumvents the standing doctrine, which says that in order to bring
suit one must have a discernible injury. In effect, the Act creates an army of
private attorneys general, who can institute actions without demonstrating
personal injury. In addition, the discretionary-functions immunity is not a bar
to influencing the bureaucracy under this Act.
Here I am making a descriptive rather than normative statement. I am
simply saying that if someone were an activist citizen who wanted to influence
the behavior of the bureaucracy, it would be in his interest to find an alternative to direct damage actions against individual officials; for such an alternative would circumvent the standing doctrine and the immunity for discretionary functions.
Personally, I am opposed to some of these alternatives. If I had to think of
a justification for suits against officials, it would be that suits can force them
to release information about the operation of the bureaucracy. To change
bureaucratic behavior, I would just disseminate that information on Capitol
Hill-though I am afraid that is a very treacherous game to play. The processes that are free of the standing doctrine and discretionary-functions immunity give no guarantee of deriving better information than the more
limited process of damage suits. All they do is to multiply the strategic
possibilities for activists without improving the information that is derived.
In fact, these strategic complications make me oppose even official liability
for this purpose. While I too am appalled by most government intervention, I
am a strong supporter of absolute immunity for officials engaged in discretionary functions. My reason is that we already have too many lawyers, and official liability would only increase the amount of litigation further. Most

33.

Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4371-74 (1970).-Ed.
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people's thinking about torts is about ten years behind the times. They consider a routine automobile accident to be the typical tort case. But today tort
lawyers are engaged-not in such simple cases-but in the equivalent of
World War II in multiple-party litigation, elaborate discovery procedures,
cross-venue litigation, and the lot. If official immunity is eliminated, each
drug case-just to take my favorite example-will name every official in the
Food and Drug Administration as a party defendant. The administrative
complications would be enormous.
IV
ALTERNATIVES TO LIABILITY

A.

What Are the Alternatives?

1. Legislative Oversight
SHEPSLE.
Professor Epstein's comment introduces an important point. We
have been looking at a very narrow notion of official liability. We have been
pretending that there is nothing else to encourage bureaus to behave reasonably, that bureaus have complete discretion, and that they are not called on
the carpet for errors. In fact, there are many other remedies besides official
liability. One is the sponsoring of legislation that affects agency budgets and
authorizations.
We should not entirely believe those people who have criticized Congress
for not responding to the mandate of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946," 4 which instructed congressional committees to be "continuously watchful." Well, of course, they are not continuously watchful-God help us if they
were. But there is much latent oversight conducted by individual Congressmen and congressional committees, and bureau chiefs are responsive to
it. In the remainder of our discussions we ought to consider notions of immunity that allow for these alternatives.

2. ProceduralConstraints
MASHAW.
There are two major alternatives to civil liability as a means of
providing incentives to government officers. The first is bargain, by which
parties interested in government decisions can participate in the decisionmaking. The second is proscription-that is, internal regulations that control offi-

cial behavior.
If one accepts this mode of analysis, one might immediately jump to the

conclusion that the civil-liability system is extremely attractive: bargaining is
34. The Monroney-Lafollette Act, Pub. L. 70-601.-Shepsle. Codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 31, 72a,
74a, 74b, 88a, 132a, 132b, 261-270; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1022, 1024; 31 U.S.C. §§ 59, 60; 33 U.S.C.
§ 525-533; 40 U.S.C. §§ 166, 174d-1 (1970).-Ed.
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almost impossible, because officials are not candid; and the bureaucracy has
little will to police itself through internal regulation. Civil liability therefore
seems to be the only possible means for providing appropriate incentives to
government officers.
However, some bureaucratic behavior closely approximates bargaining,
and within certain areas of activity bureaus probably do a reasonably good job
of policing themselves. First, consider the contexts in which bureaus reach
decisions by bargaining. Where the bureau's mission is to make a ruling-that
is, in the areas of adjudication and policy-formation-interested parties participate in the decisionmaking and may impose costs on the decisionmakers.
In addition to participating overtly, interested parties can participate covertly
through delaying tactics, extended presentations, and the like, which impose
costs on the decisionmakers. Within these contexts bureaucrats are facing
something like negotiations or bargaining. Their resources for dealing with
the interested parties are not unlimited.
Next, consider the willingness of bureaus to police themselves. Bureau
managers are willing to invest resources in policing the activities of lower-level
officials, particularly within the core mission of the bureau. In performing the
peculiar duties of their bureau, officers are bound by the manual; and they
usually lack the authority to take actions not covered by the manual. So in
these areas official behavior may be highly regulated and monitored.
If these assertions about bargaining and policing are true, then civil liability may not be needed to influence official behavior in policy formulation,
adjudication, or the core mission of individual bureaus. It may be needed only
in the residual areas-areas that are incidental to a bureau's activity or do not
involve policy formulation and application. Examples are constitutional rights
that are not the special charge of any particular agency, activities of decentralized officials who are difficult to monitor, and proprietary activites.
Relaxation of the immunity doctrine is taking place in precisely these situations: violations of constitutional rights and injuries caused in the performance of proprietary functions by officials not engaged in the formulation or
application of policy. I therefore think that the emerging structure of official
liability is about as good as can be expected: the courts have got it essentially
right.
Now, we may wish to argue that civil liability is preferable to bargaining or
internal policing in some contexts. This argument requires a cost comparison
among the different possible means of providing appropriate incentives. And
as we begin to compare the cost-effectiveness of these different means, we
have to include the costs that result when civil liability creates inappropriate
incentives. Civil liability has different effects on different official activities. It
is very difficult to specify in advance what incentives it will present to officials.
We do not understand very much about the incentive structure of bureaucracies. Officials do not necessarily respond to the policies that are elaborated
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in statutes and regulations, or even to the micropolitics of their bureaus. And
because of the costs of the inappropriate incentives it is apt to produce, civil
liability will probably appear cost-effective only where the alternatives are
either inoperative or ineffective.
3. JudicialReview
SACKS. Jerry Mashaw mentioned another of the alternatives to civil liability in his response to Bill Baxter's argument against judicial second-guessing.
Bill Baxter had argued in his paper that the courts shouldn't second-guess
agency decisions in damage suits because they are not competent to make the
highly technical decisions that agencies make. In his response to the commentaries Jerry Mashaw pointed out that the courts address these decisions in
judicial review35 processes, and are therefore not necessarily unqualified to do
so in damage actions. I would like to hear both parties expand their points on
this particular alternative.
BAXTER.

I didn't assert in my paper that a court is less competent than,

for example, the Federal Communications Commission to make decisions
about broadcast licenses. I asserted only that Congress has already addressed
the question which institution is the appropriate one for those decisions. So
that question has been settled, even if it has been settled wrongly. If we wish
to dispute Congress' choice of the appropriate institution, the sensible solution
is not to heap two forms of judicial review on the FCC. If the courts are in
fact better suited to making decisions on broadcast licenses, the solution is to
abolish the FCC and transfer the decisionmaking to the courts in the first
instance.
MASHAW.
I think that we are confusing two issues. One issue is the duplication of causes of action for essentially the same claim against the FCC. I
agree with Bill Baxter that we should not have that. At the very least, if both
judicial review and damage actions are available to plaintiffs, there should be
some requirement for joinder of the claims. The second issue is whether any
judicial remedy at all should be available. And here I disagree with Bill Baxter
when he implies that providing judicial remedies entails the transfer to the
courts of the decisionmaking power. I would agree that we should limit the
judicial remedies to prevent second-guessing of agency decisions. But under
the standard of reasonableness that I described earlier, such second-guessing
would not occur. The question for the court is not whether a decision was
right or wrong but whether it was within the boundaries of reasonable decisionmaking, given that the agency has been assigned the primary task of
making the decision.

35.

See note 11 supra and accompanying text.-Ed.
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STEWART.
I would like to ask Jerry Mashaw if' he is suggesting that damage remedies would be useful in addition to judicial review in cases where an
agency's action is unreasonable. It seems to me that a party disappointed in
judicial review could then always make an allegation of unreasonableness, obtain wider powers of discovery, and cause long delays. Civil liability would
cause all of the administrative costs that Richie Epstein mentioned earlier.
And disappointed parties would be able to harass an agency in many ways
that are not possible in judicial review.
MASHAW.
I think that there is a modest role for damage actions in addition to judicial review. There are cases in which the traditional review does
not provide redress or, moreover, sufficient incentives for the victims to seek
it. Consider an FCC licensing case that goes through hearings for a number
of years. By the time judicial review is reached, the disappointed applicant has
disbanded his company and would find it extremely costly to regroup and
take the license. In this case, the remedy offered by judicial review is not the
remedy desired, and the injured party does not find it worthwhile to undertake the expense of litigation. On the other hand, damages might offer sufficient incentives to continue seeking redress.
STEWART.
If it were not for the possibilities of harassment that I just
mentioned, I would think that damage actions would be preferable to judicial
review on other grounds too. For example, where an agency's decision cannot
take effect until all the appeal procedures have been exhausted, the disappointed applicant has incentives to cause delays in the judicial review so that
he can continue marketing his product or using his license. Since damage
actions would only be available after the decision had taken effect, plaintiffs
would not have these incentives for delay. In addition, judicial review does
not make clear the social costs of erroneous government action, as damage
remedies do. So in an ideal world-where damage actions wouldn't be used to
harass the government-damage actions might be preferable to this particular
alternative.

B.

Why Seek Alternatives to Civil Liability?

1. Problems of Valuation in Civil Liability Suits
EPSTEIN.
The problem with liability suits is the evaluation of damages.
There may be data on the value of damages, but those data may not be meaningful.
LEVINE.
One of the problems with any damage remedy is the need for a
baseline. The court must establish a hypothetical wealth level from which the
plaintiff's current wealth level can be subtracted to yield the amount to which
he has been damaged. This hypothetical value is very difficult to establish in
the areas of government activity.
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It is hard enough to calculate damages in straight commercial
EPSTEIN.
cases where there has been a breach of contract. But it is even harder in
regulatory cases in which the denial of a license has prevented the plaintiff
from even making contracts. One can't say what might have happened if the
license had been granted.
In fact, somebody could say that the denial of a license saved the plaintiff
from the greatest regulatory snafu in the world. If he had been allowed to
begin doing business, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission would
have taken action against him, and everything would have been lost: thank
God he didn't get the license.
If damages are actually this difficult to calculate, we know that any particular calculation is likely to be wrong. Perhaps alternative procedures, no matter
how bad they are, would be preferable.
STEWART.

But there are similar problems of valuation in private litiga-

tion.
TULLOCK.

I agree. The ordinary physical damage to an individual, which

has of course been calculated for a long time, is just as uncertain as these
other damages. The courts have just gotten used to being wrong. The best
example is a woman whose face is damaged in an automobile accident, who
attempts to recover damages for the value of her lost good looks. I would
submit that this case is at least as difficult as the official-liability cases. Yet
because the courts have been making that kind of error all these years, they
go ahead making them. I don't see why they can't go ahead and make errors
in the area of official liability as well.
The point is that the damages caused by government officers are
different from the damages in private suits. They are different precisely because the baseline is affected by the policy of the agency involved. In areas
that are pervasively regulated-which turns out to be a lot of areas these
days-it is difficult to hypothesize the plaintiff's wealth level in the absence of
the policy being challenged. The question is not only, What would the plaintiff have been worth in the absence of this policy? but also, What other policy
would the agency have adopted in the absence of this one? Only by examining
possible alternative actions can you determine the amount of the damages.
In fact, one might expect an agency to adjust its policies to minimize the
impact of a finding of negligence. This is somewhat fanciful, of course-but
an agency might regulate its constituents so that their property was not worth
very much. This would not be minimizing the probability of losing a
lawsuit-which would be desirable-but minimizing the value of what the
agency will be sued for destroying. An agency regulating land use, for example, might use its regulations to make land worth as little as possible; in the
event of an error, the agency could then never be sued for very much.
LEVINE.
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BROWN.
I think that Mike Levine is absolutely right that valuation is a
problem with damage actions. But it is also a problem in all areas of
policymaking. All policymaking attempts to minimize harm-among other
things. The very concept of harm involves a comparison of an actual event
with a counterfactual event. And very often the counterfactual event would
depend on the actions of the individual making the comparison. Antitrust
policy is a classic example: it requires the estimation of market behavior under
various counterfactual conditions. Thus, I do not see how valuation problems
distinguish damage actions from any form of policymaking.
LEVINE.
To answer John Brown's question, the reason that valuation
problems are particularly important to the question of civil liability is that they
account for the interest in certain alternatives to liability-and in particular,
for the obsession with procedural due process. It is easy to see why the courts
have focused on due process. They think that all they can do is ensure that
everyone has been heard, that all the procedures have been followed. This at
least creates a sense of participation.
SHAPO.

Are you suggesting that procedural fairness is not important?

LEVINE.
No. I am simply saying that the valuation problems attending
damage actions are reasons for considering alternative review procedures. Extended review procedures can produce very undesirable results; but damage
remedies may be no more desirable.

2.

An Alternative to EvaluatingDamages

DELLINGER.
One solution to the problem of valuation may be to use a
different basis for calculation, as Professor Mashaw suggested briefly in his
paper. Rather than attempt to compensate the plaintiff for the precise value
of his loss, we might concentrate on providing the proper incentives to the
official. Our goal is to reduce the probability of error in official decisions-not
to zero, of course, but to some optimal level. One method is to require a
panoply of procedures before a decision can be made. The other is to make
the official liable for his errors and allow him to decide what procedures to
follow.
Viewed in this light, the problem is not how to compensate the plaintiff
but how to present to the official the appropriate incentives for care. If we
were to calculate the plaintiff's award on this basis, civil liability would be no
more problematic than its alternatives. For example, in requiring due process,
we have to decide what the proper level of process is-that is, how many
procedures to require. I would suggest that this determination is no easier
than the determination of the plaintiff's award on the basis I have described.
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V
CALCULATING THE INCENTIVES OF GOVERNMENT OFFICERS

OLSON.

So much of this discussion has failed to produce clear and con-

structive conflict because different participants have been proposing official

liability or criticizing official liability as an answer to different questions. Is it
the answer to the need for compensation for the victims of official mistakes?
or is it the answer to the problem of big and intrusive government? or is it the
answer to inefficiency and ineptitude in government? We haven't reached a
consensus on which of these problems is most urgent and which of them official liability should address.
However, it seems that the one problem we come back to most often is ineptitude, negligence, and inefficiency among government officials. We all seem
to want a better system to motivate government officials to do a good job.
A.

Skewed Incentives

GOETZ. The problem with using official liability to encourage good official performance is that it distorts the incentives of government officers.
Imagine a bureaucrat who performs two different activities x and y. We can
think of him as trying to maximize a function whose first term is the gross
benefits from each activity. The second term in the function reflects the risk
that x and y will injure private parties. That risk is a function not only of the
amounts of x and y but also of the care exercised in their performance. So the
net benefits of the bureaucrat's activities-that is, the gross benefits minus the
risks-are a function of at least three variables, the amount of activity x, the
amount of activity y, and the amount of care exercised.
Our purpose is to ensure that this bureaucrat exercises the correct amount
of care in the performance of given optimal levels of x and y. The correct
amount of care is determined by the marginal social costs and benefits of
exercising care. And an efficient level of care would be produced by sanctions
proportionate to the marginal bureaucrat's costs of care. In some government
activities the marginal cost of care is very high, and strong sanctions would be

required to induce officials to exercise care. In other activities, however, it is

almost as easy to perform carefully as to perform carelessly; relatively modest
sanctions would be sufficient in these activities. In the latter case tort liability
might actually be excessive.
A result of excessive sanctions in such activities is that incentives are
skewed. Our purpose in designing an official's incentives is not to alter the
makeup of his activities: that is, we want incentives that will adjust the officials' levels of care in producing x and y but not distort the levels at which x
and y are produced. The problem is that the official bears some of the costs
of exercising care but may not bear any of the consequences of adjusting x
and y. Civil liability will give him an incentive to minimize his risk-producing
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errors. But if he can do so by altering his level or mixture of the two activities
rather than by exercising more care, he will. Though x is a very beneficial
function, the bureaucrat will avoid it if it carries a substantial risk. Or assume
that x and y have risks amounting to the same expected value of injury to
private parties, but that x has a small probability of causing a large injury and
y has a large probability of causing a small injury. If the errors caused by y are
not large enough to exceed the threshold where civil suits would be justified,
the official will prefer many small losses to the infrequent disaster caused by
x. So he will favor activities with frequent small errors, even when the aggregate of the small losses greatly exceeds the infrequent major loss.
OLSON.
I would add another term to this model. Official liability would
provide government officers with incentives to exercise some kinds of care but
not others. If an official did not have official immunity, he would need a
method of protecting himself against damage actions. Since courts are very
concerned about procedures, the official would have to be fussy about procedures. He would have to keep more carbon paper around, keep better records, and protect himself in other ways. But other kinds of care, which might
not be as effective in a court defense, would not be encouraged. Conversely,
only those harmful actions that are easily detectible and susceptible to proof
in court would be discouraged by civil liability: equally harmful actions might
not be equally discouraged.
Consider the following story: An official of the Economic Development
Administration, which is charged with aiding depressed and poor areas, observed that the Eskimos near Nome, Alaska, had incomes low enough to qualify for aid under the Economic Development Act. He traveled to Nome to ask
the Eskimos what they really needed. They said that since their main business
was fishing, and since the outdoor temperatures occasionally rose above freezing, they really needed a giant cold-storage plant. The administrator reportedly said, "Iceboxes for Eskimos? Not a chance."
This official was probably wise to refuse this request. Given the present
system of incentives-and particularly the strong incentives brought to bear
on bureaucrats and politicians by journalists-it would have been a terrible
error to build a cold-storage plant in Nome. This case illustrates the general
rule that officials can get in terrible trouble for a mistake that is blatant or
conspicuous, even if its consequences are of no quantitative significance. Officials must not act indefensibly, but they may be inefficient or ineffective in
ways that are of great significance but are not easily detected.
In this way official liability would only encourage certain types of care and
only discourage particular types of error.
SHEPSLE.
We should add further that official liability might provide incentives for exercising too much care. Professor Mashaw correctly identified
the issue by underscoring the need for "efficient care." The incentive system
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we are looking for would encourage those who can most cheaply reduce errors to do so and encourage others to continue committing errors if the cost
of reducing them exceeds the damage they do. For example, it might be
cheaper to continue paying excessive benefits to welfare recipients who cheat
than to investigate every recipient. The question in official liability is whether
we are encouraging too much caution.
CLARKSON.

In many cases that is not the correct question. Civil liability

may in fact improve the efficiency of many bureaus that are being too careful
now. For example, the Small Business Administration is directed to give loans
to enterprises that have been turned down by banks as being too risky. Yet
the Small Business Administration actually has a record of loan repayments
that is better, on the average, than that of banks. Why? Because they are
being too careful: they are discriminating too well among the businesses rejected by banks and lending only to those presenting low risk. If businesses
rejected by the Small Business Administration could sue the Administration's
officers, the officials would be encouraged to take more risks.
Cost-benefit analysis has been written into the law for government operations but has never been formally used in budgeting. The Office of Management and Budget's circular A- 11 governs all budget decisions but has not
incorporated cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, agencies often fail to file
cost-benefit analyses when they are required. Again, civil liability might
modify this inefficient behavior.
MANNE.
Some of these problems have led us away from the notion of
official liability. One of the reasons that we are interested in official liability is
that officials are not sufficiently constrained by present devices and techniques. They are often arbitrary, mean, stupid, and venal. If we can choose
one of those characteristics, such as stupidity, and correct it by delivering its
costs to the officials personally, it would have to be beneficial.

It's odd that the one characteristic you picked from the list is the
one for which I suspect civil liability would be least effective: stupidity.
LEVINE.

MANNE.

Well, I had negligence in mind.

LEVINE. But if you mean stupidity rather than carelessness, civil liability is
probably not a very effective deterrent.

To expand on Michael Levine's point, I would like to ask how
civil liability would improve the performance of officials who make simple
mistakes because they are not competent to handle the task they have been
given. These errors can be very, very costly. But holding the erring officials
personally liable will not prevent them. More care will be taken and more
information will be compiled to show that every T has been crossed, but civil
liability will not produce more intelligence in addition to more care.
ROBINSON.

DISCUSSION
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B.

The Incentives of Sovereign Liability

1. Arguments For Sovereign Liability
a.

Employees Do Not Claim the Benefits of Their Production

LEVINE.
The issue of skewed incentives requires a comparison of the incentives for the enterprise and the incentives for the employee. Typically, an
individual employee in an organization-aside from the entrepreneur-cannot
capture the gains from many of his decisions. Yet if he is held personally
liable for the losses he inflicts on others, he will bear many of the costs of his
decisions. This is what causes the severe skewing of his incentives that encourages timidity. Perhaps we should look at the incentives of the enterprise instead: the enterprise does capture the gains of its activity, and therefore may
be the more logical entity to bear the costs.

MANNE.
You're wrong. Employees do in fact claim the marginal value of
their productivity. There is no reason to believe, and we certainly have no
data to suggest, that the market for employees of corporations doesn't work
very effectively.
LEVINE.
There are reasons to believe that employees cannot capture their
marginal product in a carefully calibrated paycheck, particularly in organizations with large numbers of employees and accountants. There are reasons to
suspect that the employee's product is not fully reflected in the market for his
labor.
First, large organizations are characterized by collective production: it isn't
clear how much each person contributes to the output. Secondly, the qualities
of individual employees are frequently unknown, although it may be clear
that a group operates well. And thirdly, large organizations cannot control
their employees' behavior in detail: the employees who are responsible for
hiring other employees and rewarding them for their production may do so
imperfectly.
MANNE.

I am not sure what to do here. We seem to be going off on a

slightly different tangent.
LEVINE.

Oh, no. This is quite central, Henry. You may not like it, but it's

central.
b.

Sovereign Liability Spreads Risks

GOETZ.
Sovereign liability is preferable to official liability where there are
many risky activities of an insurable type. When compared with the risks to
individuals, the risks to the enterprise are slight. If a municipality is made
liable, for example, for the errors of its police force, its risk costs must be
subtracted from the benefits derived from the entire force. An individual
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police officer might find the risk of personal liability intimidating; but the
City of New York, for example, would spread that risk over the benefits derived from 25,000 policemen, and is more likely to select the combination of
costs and objectives sought by the citizens. So the incentives of sovereign liability are less skewed.
2.

Arguments Against Sovereign Liability
a.

Problems of Municipal Liability

GOETZ.
How would enterprise liability work with governments? In corporations the stockholders at least have limited liability, and corporations are
ultimately execution-proof. But what will happen if there is a very large
judgment against a rather small government unit? The people who stand in
the relation of stockholders to the government-that is, the taxpayers-do not
have limited liability. How will damages of this size be paid? Will the government simply go out of business?
DELLINGER. There are a number of lawsuits in which judgments were
made against municipal corporations. School desegregation cases also impose
costs on municipalities. Some courts have ordered increases in the property
tax rate to meet these costs. Another example would be a court injunction for
the improvement of a substandard jail. If the voters turn down a bond issue
for these improvements, there is no provision for an injunction against indi-

vidual taxpayers. I suppose a court could then order the governing body to

increase the property tax rate despite the taxpayers' vote.
GOETZ.
These examples are still cases of small judgments in proportion
to the tax base. What about major disasters? What if a city's natural-gas plant
blows up and causes $100 million in damages?
MANNE.

EPSTEIN.

There goes the tax base.
Federal disaster relief would be the only solution.

LEVINE.
There is no simple answer to Charlie Goetz's question about
municipal liability. It raises a problem that is carefully ignored in torts classes.
Many defendants are judgment-proof by virtue of the limited size of their
assets. We don't have debtors' prison, and bankruptcy law provides most defendants with immunity from the ultimate execution of large damage claims.
The extent to which a municipality can avail itself of this immunity is still
unknown-look at the case of New York. But it certainly does limit the incentives that can be created by sovereign liability.
MANNE.
The mere fact that some cases are very difficult to prove or that
some defendants are judgment-proof doesn't enter into the question of what
the substantive rule of law ought to be. Furthermore, I think you are ignoring
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the point that many of the actions we have been talking about would be used
primarily for strategic purposes, not for financial compensation.
b.

Agencies Are Not Susceptible to the Incentives of Liability

When discussing sovereign liability it is terribly important to
distinguish among the sovereign and its various enterprises, the bureaus and
agencies. Sovereign liability often affects the U.S. Treasury and the Department of Justice. Too often a different agency of the government does the
harm, but the Treasury and Department of Justice bear the costs.
I consulted with the Department of Justice to design schemes that would
transfer these costs to the erring bureaus. Many of these schemes would force
the bureaus to prepare all of the documentation that the Justice Department
required in defending civil liability suits. The costs of documentation were
significant to the bureaus, since their budgets had been set two years earlier.
We also encouraged some of the agencies, especially those engaged in
land-condemnation procedures, to be much more generous. We encouraged
them to overcompensate and to take excessive losses rather than risk harming
private parties. This usually reduced the caseload of the Justice Department,
cleared up various courts, and simplified things tremendously. But the reduction in caseload was accomplished only by the threat that the agencies would
have to prepare the case documentation if they didn't reduce the number of
suits.
One problem with these schemes was that the Department of Justice hated
to give up its role as the government's lawyer. They liked representing the
government in all of these cases. We had to make them understand that as
they clung to these cases, many other important cases were being ignored. It
was to their benefit to encourage the agencies to alter their behavior, and one
way of encouraging them was to impose the costs of litigation on them. In
part we succeeded in our arguments, the government changed, and some improvements were made.
The Justice Department is not the only department that could improve the
incidence of liability costs. There are various budgetary schemes that the
Treasury might use to impose the costs of damage awards on the erring
bureau. Part of the budgetary allocation to each agency might be used to
purchase insurance against civil liability. If surpluses were generated thereby,
the agencies might be given budgetary discretion over them. This would encourage the agencies to reduce the risk of damage awards in order to obtain
this budgetary bonus.
MARGOLIS.

CAPRON.
I agree with a lot of the things that Julie Margolis has said, but
I think that his perception of the budgetary process is different from mine. I
don't think that government agencies will be allowed to keep unspent money
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from insurance funds in their budgets. They won't be allowed discretion over
the use of that money.
My experience of the budgetary process leads me to make the
opposite criticism. Suppose that all of the costs of liability for a major blunder
were imposed on an agency. How would this affect its behavior? I suggest that
SCOTT.

it would simply ask for supplemental appropriations. In its next budget it will
take certain liability-reducing measures that would offset the newly imposed

expected liability costs, but a permanent change in its behavior may not benefit the employees of the agency at all.
CRAIN.
The lack of incentives for agencies is indeed an argument for
individual official liability. In an agency, where there is no private ownership,
no individual will bear the cost of mistakes by poor decisionmakers. The cost
is diffused, and each taxpayer bears a pro rata share. Stockholders in the
private sector have an incentive to hire better decisionmakers, because their
wealth is directly affected by the cost of mistakes.

c.

Agencies Cannot Transmit Incentives to Their Employees

SHEPSLE. Another problem with sovereign liability is that it would not
offer the same benefits as official liability unless the government enterprise

has expedient ways to control its officers.
LEVINE. This is why I find the discussion of incentives discouraging in
the contexts of both official liability and sovereign liability: the government
enterprise can't control its employees. I don't mean that it can't keep them
from running berserk through the halls. I mean that it simply cannot finely
calibrate their behavior. If the enterprise is held liable, it will perhaps bear the
costs of errors; but it can't control the behavior that causes those errors and
needs to be modified to prevent them.

3.

Arguments Against the Comparison

CAPRON.
I think we are too ignorant about incentives to make generalizations about the entire government. We have to speak of particular agencies
and particular kinds of officials. A police force is very different from the
Federal Aviation Administration.

In the upper reaches of the bureaucracy, I would say, there will be no

difference in incentives between official liability and sovereign liability. If an
agency is sued, the appointed officials in it will still suffer: the main cost will
be the damage to their reputations, and they are not going to be particularly
relieved that their personal assets are not at issue. At this level of the
bureaucracy other incentives will dominate the incentives of official liability.
The same will not be true for police officers, however, to whom official and
sovereign liability may seem to differ substantially.
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I think that we are discussing the issue of sovereign liability versus official liability on very narrow grounds. The notion of official immunity reflects a larger social decision that the government should operate
inexpensively by hiring risk-averse employees. This is similar to the decision
of universities to pay professors less by giving them tenure. One cannot argue
that the structure of incentives favors individual liability over sovereign liability without considering whether the market for government employees would
change. If we impose official liability, we might also have to give the President
a very large budget that allowed him to buy a Secretary of State for $400,000
a year.
HOCHMAN.

C.

The Incentives of Liability Combined With Indemnification

1. Indemnification of the Official by the GovernmentDoes It Approximate Sovereign Liability?
BAXTER.
I do not find the problem of internal discipline to be a reason
for believing that official liability will be any better than enterprise liability.
An agency can always blunt the impact of official liability by indemnifying its
agents. We are stuck with a certain amount of inefficiency under either system: if the agency is liable, it may fail to discipline its agents; if the agents are
liable, the agency may weaken its internal discipline by indemnifying them.
The only advantage of official liabililty is in the unusual cases in which we
want certain kinds of behavior to be totally eliminated-such as police
brutality-and in which indemnification would be impossible for political reasons.
The advantage of sovereign liability lies in the compensation of those injured by the government-which we have mostly ignored. But as for the discipline of government agents, I find the two systems equally discouraging.
SACKS.
I am told that the reason policemen are sued-at least in the State
of Connecticut-is that the plaintiffs expect to collect, not from the policemen, but ultimately from the municipality. Either the municipality has taken
out liability insurance and pays a premium on the officers' behalf, or the
municipality will pay for a judgment out of its general funds. The reason that
the municipality will pay these damages, I am told, is pressure from the police
force. If the municipality will not stand behind its officers, even if they are
guilty of willful misconduct, it will have serious problems with the force.

a.

Differences of Incentives Between Official Liability With
Indemnification and Sovereign Liability

DAVIS. The fundamental difference between official liability with indemnification and sovereign liability is that in the former an individual is the nom-
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inal defendant. This may or may not have advantages.
One possible advantage of retaining the individual as the nominal defendant is that persons who may be more inclined to sue the enterprise may
pause if they know that a named individual will be seriously inconvenienced.
Moreover, unmeritorious plaintiffs may be more likely to win damages from
the enterprise than when the individual is the nominal defendant. To what
extent would the requirement of suing an individual official discourage litigation? To what extent would it prevent unmerited awards?
A possible disadvantage in retaining the individual as a nominal defendant
is that official discretion may be unduly inhibited by officials' fear of being
named in lawsuits. Even though an official may not be personally liable for
damages if they are shifted to the government enterprise, it is a serious inconvenience for him to be named as a defendant. There are, above all,
psychological costs.
SHAVELL.
First Professors Baxter and Sacks argued that it does not make
a difference whether legal liability is imposed on the enterprise or on the
official, since the enterprise will bear the costs in either case. Now Professor
Davis has argued that the use of official liability may make a difference, since
it would cause individual officials to be named as defendants, even if they
were then indemnified against financial loss. The counterargument to Davis is
that, on the one hand, the individual officials would still be named under
sovereign liability and, on the other hand, that if the agency truly indemnified
them under official liability, it would handle all of the legal proceedings as
well.
My question, therefore, is whether we can say that there is really no difference between sovereign liability and official liability. I realize that there are
exceptions, such as Professor Baxter's case of police brutality. But can we
equate the two in general?

b.

Differences in the Compensation of Injured Parties

EPSTEIN.
There would be a difference if there were official liability, indemnification of officials, and sovereign immunity. The reason is that indemnification must follow a financial loss to the official; the government
could insist on paying only that amount which is paid by the official. If the
individual official has net assets of $50,000, and a judgment of $10 billion is
entered against him, recovery will be limited by the official's assets, and will
therefore be much less than under sovereign liability.
This is one of the problems inherent in applying different rules of liability
to the official and the enterprise. I think there is a theoretical objection to this
lack of symmetry in the sovereign-liability model you propose. There are two
possible interpretations of enterprise liability. On the one hand, enterprise
liability could be the vicarious liability of the employer for the wrongful acts
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of its servants. In that case, the underlying standards of liability for the individual are preserved, and the employer is merely named as the defendant in
the case in which the individual's conduct is to be evaluated. On the other
hand, enterprise liability could be analogous to products liability, that is, to a
principle that an enterprise should bear the cost of all injuries associated with
its operations.
I think that only one of these interpretations will be successful in application to government enterprises. If sovereign liability is interpreted as the vicarious liability of the government enterprise for the actions of its servants,
then the applicable liability rules are well known and appear to be reasonably
workable. If sovereign liability is interpreted as analogous to products liability,
however, a number of problems arise: first, the principles of products liability
are in great flux today; and, second, they would be rather difficult to apply to
the actions of individual government officials.
The vicarious-liability model is attractive for another reason. One of the
traditional justifications for vicarious liability was the difficulty of assigning
responsibility to individual employees in certain cases in which the responsibility of some employee was nevertheless clear. One knew that someone in the
enterprise was at fault, and vicarious liability relieved the plaintiff of the task
of identifying which employee it was. The law simply held the employer vicariously liable for all of his employees and left him to apportion individual
liability if he wanted. Official liability poses the same problems of apportionment in cases involving numerous officials. This is particularly true in discretionary functions, where responsibility may be difficult to assign. This is
why sovereign liability might be viewed as solving some of the same problems
as vicarious liability.
However, the application of vicarious liability to the government poses certain theoretical problems.
The rule of vicarious liability is that the principal is liable when the agent
is liable; or, conversely, that where the agent cannot be held responsible,
neither can the principal. Official immunity shields government agents from
liability, and would therefore hinder the application of this rule to sovereign
liability. But the principle behind the rule could be preserved if the agents
were held responsible by their superiors: in that case, the sovereign could be
made liable for its agents' actions without being asked to bear a responsibility
that the agents do not.
But if the internal discipline of government agencies is incomplete, then
sovereign liability would indeed seem inappropriate. Take, for example, the
case of the Chicago Transit District train that ran off the tracks and hit ten
people. In the course of discovery in that case it was learned that when the
city considered a suspension motion against a union employee, it couldn't consider safety violations that occurred more than a year earlier. In this case the
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union's contract determined the extent to which employees could be held responsible. And an appropriate sovereign-liability rule would thus have to
change every time the contract changed, if it were to avoid holding the principal responsible when the agent is not.
Of course no respectable authority claims that vicarious liability is precluded if union rules prevent the city from disciplining its employees. The
issue of vicarious liability was undisputed both before and after the accident.
My point was simply that the appropriate rule in vicarious liability holds the
principal liable only when the agent is liable, and that the combination of
official immunity and insufficient internal controls should therefore make
sovereign liability inappropriate. I therefore favor a combination of official
and sovereign liability.
A system of official and sovereign liability in tandem would prevent the
problem of indemnification from arising: the compensation available to a
plaintiff would not be limited by the assets of the individual defendant, since
recovery would be available from the enterprise through vicarious liability.
Richie Epstein's insistence on official and sovereign liability in
tandem is rather peculiar. A plaintiff who is simply interested in recovering
damages would sue an agency rather than an official. The only reason I can
imagine for suing an official if recovery is available from the sovereign is to
increase the costs imposed by litigation. Richie referred earlier to the undesirability of massive suits with many parties. Precisely for the sake of preventing them, I would be inclined to favor absolute enterprise liability and absolute official immunity.
BAXTER.

We were discussing the difference between sovereign liability
and official liability with indemnification. I think that Richard Epstein noted
one difference that hasn't been fully explored. If there is a system of individual liability with indemnification, many plaintiffs will lose their suits because they cannot identify the offending officer. If direct action were available
against the government, it would be sufficient to show that some employee of
the government is responsible for an injury. Government indemnification of
officials would thus make recovery much less likely.
DELLINGER.

c.

Incentives Skewed by Indemnification

We keep assuming that the government will always indemnify officials if liability were imposed on them. The legislature could always
decide not to provide indemnification. Or there might be imperfections in the
indemnity system that led to indemnification for certain kinds of damages but
not for others. This reintroduces the question of skewed incentives.
DELLINGER.

MASHAW.

If the government refused to indemnify officials, they would

perceive the relaxation of official immunity as a cut in salary; to the extent
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that their services were valued more highly elsewhere, they would tend to
seek other employment. In addition, they might be able to limit the effectiveness of the government's failure to indemnify them by avoiding activities in
which liability without indemnification is likely.
2.

Indemnification of the Government by the OfficialDoes It Approximate Official Liability?

These comments seem to indicate that if compensation is
our goal, it makes no sense to hold the official liable, even if he will be indemnified: sovereign liability will do the job better. If bureaucratic discipline is
our goal, official liability presents problems of skewed incentives, as Charlie
Goetz pointed out. For example, military pilots may not defend the nation
with appropriate vigor if they are responsible for damage caused by sonic
booms. But at some point the deterrence benefit of official liability should
exceed these costs of overcautiousness. At that point, I suggest, we ought to
consider the converse of official liability with indemnification, namely, sovereign liability with indemnification. If we held the government liable, when
should we also hold individuals liable by allowing the government to sue them
for indemnification?
To answer that question we might look at the private sector. I suspect that
corporations seldom sue their employees for indemnification when the employees have been merely negligent. For example, when the General Motors
engineers designed the Corvair, they may have imposed considerable losses on
General Motors; 3 6 but I doubt that General Motors would seek indemnification from them. But if a printer at the Washington Post smashed up its presses,
I think that the Post would sue him for damages. Another case in which indemnification might be sought is products liability. If Coca-Cola could find
the employee who put a mouse in a bottle and traumatized a drinker, I suspect the corporation would attempt to sue the employee, even if he had few
assets.
We should begin to classify these cases in order to find the line at which
the benefits of individual liability outweigh the costs. Perhaps the employee
should be held liable for indemnification when he has committed intentional
torts or been grossly negligent. In the case of mere negligence, I think the
government should be liable, but not the official. Charlie Goetz has given
reasons why it might be more efficient if the government did not seek indemnification in that situation.
ELLICKSON.

I am not sure that the degree of negligence should be the deBROWN.
terminative factor. For example, the official at Westinghouse who decided not

36.

See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).-Ellickson.
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to buy covering contracts for uranium worth a couple of billion dollars 37 may
have been merely negligent. Thus the distinction may not be useful. The distinction between gross negligence and mere negligence, as a learned judge
once said, is the difference between being a fool and being a damn fool.
a.

Differences Between Official Liability and
Sovereign Liability With Indemnification

EPSTEIN.
I should think that there is a vast difference between indemnity
actions brought by employers and actions brought against employees by third
parties. When an employer decides to bring an indemnity action, he will take
into account the hazard of demoralizing his entire staff. He will pick his
victim very carefully, and he will probably use the Ellickson test of reckless
disregard of internal procedures as his standard. He could thereby justify his
actions to the other employees.
But a third party who sues an employee directly would not care about the
morale of the employer's staff. Indeed, the third party's incentive is the opposite: he wants to break so much china in the shop that the employer will settle
with him.

b.

Differences Between the Public and Private Sectors

BROWN.
I would like to make one comment about the usefulness of the
private firm as an analog for the government enterprise. In liability suits
against private firms the judicial system merely aims to ensure that third parties are not paying the costs of inefficiency in an organization. It does not care
whether the firm is inefficient or not, so long as it pays the costs of inefficiency.
We have been seeking a different goal in liability for the government. We
have been trying not only to make the government bear the costs of inefficiency but also to make the government more efficient. One might argue that
this is not the job of the legal system. Perhaps the legal system should just
make sure that the costs of inefficiency are borne by government, and leave
the organization of government to the bureaucrats.
CRAIN.
Another difference between the private sector and the public sector in the application of enterprise liability with indemnification is that no one
in the public sector has an incentive to identify which official is responsible,
while stockholders in the private sector do. As I pointed out before, stockholders have an incentive to hire better decisionmakers; similarly, they have an
incentive to find out which officials are responsible for mistakes. But individual taxpayers have little incentive to find out which public official is responsible.

37.

See Wall Street J., Sept. 5, 1975, at 5, col. 2.-Ed.
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GOETZ.
While I agree with Mark Crain's statement about the lack of incentives for private citizens to take an interest in the workings of government,
it can be overemphasized. The same sort of argument can be made about the
incentives of the individual corporate stockholder. The important difference
between the public and private sectors is that one can buy more than one
share in the corporate sector, whereas one's share in the public sector is legally limited.

VI
FURTHER RESEARCH
SACKS.
We have engaged in a lot of speculation about whether official or
sovereign liability would increase government efficiency. Speculation and personal experience are useful, but this is a problem susceptible to research, and
we ought to collect some data.
There are two kinds of studies that could be done. First, the government
itself could be studied. At one extreme one could analyze the Idaho dam
disaster, for which the federal government will pay out about $800 million in
damages, to find out whether the Department of the Interior has improved its
procedures as a result. At the other extreme, one could examine the case in
which an FBI agent who was in charge of preventing a hijacking provoked a
shootout, and the government was held liable for damages inflicted. It would
be interesting to find out how the FBI and other agencies improved their
procedures for dealing with hijacking.
The second kind of study that I would suggest is a comparison between
private industry and government. For example, one could compare the government's response to the Idaho dam disaster to General Motor's response to
the litigation involving the Corvair. Which enterprise responded better, and
what do we learn from it?

A comparative study could be done of state jurisdictions.
Some have absolute or partial immunity for officials, some have immunity for
municipalities, and others have waived immunity or provided indemnification.
An attempt might be made to trace the different effects of these systems.
DELLINGER.

CRAIN. Another comparative study might look at privately owned water
utilities. One could examine whether the private or public companies had
fewer accidents, and how their different liability might.account for this.
BAXTER.
I would stay away from the regulated public utilities. There are
very strong reasons for believing that regulated public utilities behave more
like the Department of the Interior than like General Motors.

Comparisons between single episodes, such as the Idaho dam disaster and the Corvair litigation, present problems of measurement and inSCOTT.
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terpretation. Instead, one ought to study a large sample of cases, the obvious
example being auto accidents. One might study auto accident rates for government agencies both before and after the Tort Claims Act was passed; these
rates could be compared to those of large private enterprises with numerous
vehicles. This comparison would reveal some of the effects of liability and
immunity on the degree of institutional response and drivers' caution.

